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Abstract 
Econometric methods of correlation strength analysis between the factors of the hospital personnel labor opportunism and 
quantitative assessment of a hospital personnel labor opportunism level, forms of its manifestation in the organization of various 
workers hierarchical levels are analyzed in this article. The special attention is paid to research quantifying the dependence between 
hospital leadership labor opportunism on the one hand, and doctors, nurses – on the other.  
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1. Introduction 
The opportunistic behavior is defined by O. Williamson, as "prosecution of own interest, on insidiousness use" 
(Williamson, 1993). It implies violations of the assumed obligations, in the course of interactions of firms where often 
there are cases of violation of contractual obligations.  
We consider labor opportunism as the deliberate hidden worker's violation of the assumed liabilities provided 
by the labor contract. 
In economic literature there are descriptions of various forms of opportunistic behavior: adverse selection, 
"extortion", "moral risk", negligence - as consciously allowed negligence, their various versions and combinations. 
However for the majority of them the general conditions of emergence when collecting reliable information about 
behavior of worker demands big expenses are characteristic or is impossible in general, and "only small part of what 
people actually do at work can be controlled in details" (Nelson, 1981). The most widespread kind of opportunistic 
behavior of staff of medical institutions – "shirking" when the worker carries out the duties with smaller return, than it 
is required under the contract, or some duties carries out not in full, for example, when the doctor only superficially fills 
in clinical records, or execution of any duties shifts to nurses. To reveal this type of shirking is very difficult and 
expensive. Shirking leads to decline in quality of the performed work. 
Labor opportunism is a source of the "behavioral" uncertainty causing considerable problems in the form of 
obvious and hidden losses. By E.V. Popov's estimates ( Popov and Simonova, 2005), shrinking leads to decrease in 
productivity of activity on average by 34%, negligence leads to growth of expenses on average by 27,5%. Besides, the 
opportunism generates huge costs for protection against this type of behavior.  
The labor opportunism extends promptly on the organizations, successfully "infecting" them with quickness of 
computer viruses. However unlike IT technologies organization haven't developed reliable protection programs from 
opportunism "viruses" yet. Often it is connected rather with the low level of study of its Russian specifics, environment 
and the reasons of emergence than with weak diagnostics and "blurring" of criteria of identification of forms of 
manifestation of labor opportunism (Bodrov, 2013, 2014). The problem is complicated by lack of techniques of 
assessment not only losses of the organizations from prosperity of sophisticated opportunistic practices of working 
collectives but also lack of any of acceptable methods of measurement of  developed opportunism level in organization. 
Most of researchers (Bose A. et al., (2010), Vafai K. (2010, 2002), Bevia and Corchon (2006)), etc.  Consider 
imperfection of formal rules and contracts which, in their opinion, distort incentives of workers as the main reasons for 
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labor opportunism of the personnel of the organization. So, for example, Bose A. (2010) considering the reasons of 
emergence of sabotage of workers in relation to the colleagues, came to a disputable conclusion that this problem can be 
overcome by means of change of the principles of compensation. He claims that the source of sabotage roots in envy of 
employees when one is more successful and productive, than the other. Respectively this distinction defines a difference 
in compensation therefore the incentive to sabotage disappears if wages are equalized for workers with different 
abilities and various contributions to result of teamwork.  
In our opinion, this offer will lead only to sabotage strengthening, but not in relation to the colleagues any 
more, but in relation to the management. Equalization in payment provides disappearance of incentive of increase in 
labor costs, and workers will seek to minimize them in every possible way, defining that limit to which it is possible to 
bungle without serious consequences, without causing complaints from the management.  
Vafai K. (2010), considering methods of overcoming of individual opportunism of the head in the form of 
abuse of opportunities and abuse of power, and also in two types of group opportunism, namely arrangement to the 
agent and arrangement to the owner, suggests to derive the optimal contract which would protect the organizations from 
these types of opportunism. 
A number of the conducted empirical researches show that the aspiration of heads of firms to receive 
information on the subordinates causes emergence of various forms of abuse of power. Thus the personnel of firms isn't 
able to take effective legal formal measures against these forms of manifestation of opportunism of the heads (e.g., 
Klitgaard, (1988); Peirce, Smolinski and Rosen, (1998); Timmerman and Bajema, (1999); Vardi and Weitz, (2004); 
Campos and Pradhan, (2007). 
On our deep belief the nature of labor opportunism, especially in the Russian hospitals, has informal character. 
The opportunism of personnel and heads of the organizations is directed on restoration of the broken balance between 
their mutual expectations. The labor opportunism of the personnel is response on manager’s opportunism which is in 
abundance at the majority of the organizations. 
2. Methods  
2.1. Research model  
For research of level of labor opportunism in a war veteran’s hospital the questioning method was used. Two 
types of questionnaires were made: the first questionnaire – for an assessment of opportunism of staff of the 
organization (nurses and doctors), and the second – for heads of the organization (the chief physician, his deputies, 
chiefs of departments).  
During research, on the basis of analysis of these questionnaires, there were constructed regression models 
which allowed defining the most significant factors conducting to labor opportunism of the personnel.  
Using the received regression equations, the level of opportunism of employees and heads of hospital was 
calculated and stability degree of "opportunistic traps" was estimated.  
2.2. Group of research  
In this research continuous selection was used. The personnel of a war veteran’s hospital participated in poll 
included 172 doctors and 442 nurses of all divisions and branches aged from 22 till 65 years, and also 42 heads of 
various levels of management, in all 656 people. 
2.3. Instruments of data collection  
Questionnaires include 31 questions which express various factors of emergence and manifestation of labor 
opportunism in the organization. Factors were revealed during interviewing of the group of experts which included 
representatives of various offices and categories of the medical personnel of war veteran’s hospital: the deputy chief 
physicians managing offices, doctors, nurses. Results of questionnaires were processed with use of a method of the 
smallest squares of the regression analysis (OLS). 
In the analysis of questionnaires the conventional verbal and numerical scale of Harrington which is widely 
and effectively used in practice at the solution of various tasks by expert methods was applied for a quantitative 
assessment of the received results (Glotov and Pavelyev, (1984). 
2.4. Analysis of data  
Results of questioning of 618 medical employees of hospital and 42 heads of various levels were analyzed by 
means of a package of the applied Gretl programs. According to a research objective, necessary statistical calculations 
were carried out with use of correlation, the analysis of deviations, t-test and methods of the regression analysis.  
3. Result  
The regression analysis of the factors influencing opportunism of the personnel showed that it appeared the 
most significant of them - opportunism of the managers of hospital (X22_1, model 1, tab. 1). 
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Table 1. Factors of opportunism of workers 
Model1:OLS, used supervision 1-618 
Dependent variable: X23 opportunism of workers 
Variables B Std. Error t p 
X1  .09  .03 2.82  .01 
X4  .09  .04 2.41  .02 
X5  .01  .05 2.66  .01 
X11_1 - .13  .05 - 2.57  .01 
X12_2  .25  .05 5.08  .00 
X14  - .07  .03 - 2.74  .01 
Х22_1  .33  .04 8.62  .00 
R = .87  R2 =.75 F = 267.77 p < .05 
The revealed factors were ranged on extent of their influence on the level of opportunism of employees of 
hospital (tab. 2). 
 
Table 2. Rank of the factors influencing opportunism of workers 
Variables Name of a factor В 
Х22_1 Level of opportunism of the managers of hospital .33 
Х12_2 Level of trust of the office managers to workers .25 
Х11_1 Trust level to the managers of hospital -.13 
Х1 Workload degree .09 
Х4 Workload degree  (managers tasks) which do not belong to administrative duty .08 
Х14 Dependence of the size of compensation of the worker on results of his efforts ( the more 
he works - the more he gets paid) 
- .07 
Х5 Degree of satisfaction with work .01 
  
Factor X22_1 - opportunism of the managers of hospital has the greatest impact on opportunism of workers of a 
war veteran’s hospital [R =.57, R2 =.33, F=8.62, p < .01]. The opportunism of workers is reciprocal protective reaction 
to manager’s opportunism. 
On the basis of the conducted research on data of model 1 (tab. 1) the equation of regression of opportunism of 
the personnel was constructed that allowed to calculate its quantitative level: 
Y =.09Х1 +.08Х4 +.01233Х5-.01Х11_1 +.02Х12_2-.07Х14 +.331474Х22_1 =.28                                     [1] 
The obtained settlement data which range of changes is in the range from 0 to 1, testify to rather low level of 
opportunism of the personnel – the calculated value made.28.  
It is characteristic that growth of trust of managers of offices to the workers (X12_2, tab. 2) leads to growth of 
labor opportunism of the personnel which abuses trust [R =.50, R2 =.25, F=5.08, p<.05]. Thus growth of level of trust to 
the managers of hospital from the personnel (X11_1, tab. 2) has the return impact on its labor opportunism, reducing it 
[R =-.36, R2 =.13, F=-2.57, p <.05]. 
The opportunism of workers of a war veteran’s hospital increases because of negative dependence of the size 
of compensation of the worker on results of his efforts (the more he works - the more he gets paid) (X14, tab. 2) [R =-
.26, R2 =.07, p <.05]. The increase in the size of labor costs of the personnel doesn't lead to growth of compensation. 
Average value of answers to the matter of the questionnaire made 64 on Harrington's scale, it means that compensation 
of the medical personnel on average only for 64% is attached to work expenses.  
The analysis of the forms of manifestation of opportunism of the managers influencing opportunism of 
workers is provided in regression model 2 which results are presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Regression analysis of forms of opportunism of the managers 
Model 2:OLS, used supervision 1-618 
Dependent variable: X23 – manager’s opportunism 
Variables B Std. Error t p 
X3 .07 .03 2.28 .02 
X4 .23 .04 5.30 <.01 
X6_1 .15 .04 4.12 <.04 
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X7 .13 .03 3.87 .00 
X8_2 .16 .04 4.07 .00 
R = .81 R2 =.67 F = 258.14 p < .01 
 
Results of an assessment of extent of influence of the revealed manager’s opportunism forms on opportunism 
of the personnel are presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4.   Extent of influence of forms of opportunism of the managers on opportunism of workers 
Variables Name of a factor В 
X4 Workload degree (managers tasks) which do not belong to functions .23 
X8 2 Unfair attitude of the managers of office towards subordinates .16 
X6_1 
Regular violations or procrastination of execution of the promises made by the hospital 
managers. 
 
.15 
X7 
 
 
X3 
 
Extent of control from the manager of office of process and results of the performed 
works (the  regularity of rounds, filling of clinical records, controls terms of 
performance of instructions, check of the course of performance of long tasks, etc.) 
  Requirements to perform the work which doesn't correspond to functions 
 
.13 
 
.07 
 
Apparently according to tables 3 and 4, in a greater degree opportunism of the managers is shown in regular 
loading of subordinates by the work (tasks) which doesn't belong to their functions. [R =.48, R2 =.23, p<.01]. This 
factor causes the maximum irritation of employees.  
For identification of the reasons of opportunism of the managers regression model 3 (tab. 5) was constructed 
where as a dependent variable the indicator (X22_1) – "The level of opportunism of the managers of hospital" was 
applied. 
 
Table  5. Regression analysis of opportunism of the hospital managers 
Model 3:OLS, supervision used 1-618  
Dependent variable: X22_1 – opportunism of the managers of hospital 
Variables B Std. Error t p 
X2 .05 .02 2.59 .01 
X4 .07 .03 2.74 .01 
X5 -.06 .03 -2.02 .04 
X7 -.06 .02 -2.54 .01 
X8_1 .12 .04 3.03 .00 
X8_2 -.14 .04 -3.38 .00 
X9_1 .17 .04 4.26 .00 
X9_2 -.15 .04 -3.78 .00 
X11_1 .25 .04 5.86 .00 
X11_2 -.15 .04 -3.30 .00 
Х21_1 .06 .01 3.56 .00 
Х22_2 .68 .02 24.52 .00 
Х23 .11 .03 3.92 .00 
Х30 .05 .02 2.52 .01 
R = .96 R2 =.93 F = 587.71 p < .01 
 
In the table 6 the factors revealed in model 3 are ranged according to extent of influence on opportunism of the 
hospital managers. 
 
Table 6. Rank of factors of opportunism of the hospital managers.   
Variables Name of the factor В 
Х22_2 Level of opportunism of managers of offices .68 
X11_1 Level of your trust to the hospital managers. .25 
X9_1 Shifting their work to subordinates by the hospital managers. .17 
X9_2 Shifting of their work to subordinates by the managers of office. -.15 
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X11_2 Level of your trust to the managers of office -.15 
X8_2 Cases of the unfair attitude of the managers of office towards subordinates -.14 
X8_1 Cases of the unfair attitude of the managers of hospital towards subordinates .12 
Х23 Level of opportunism of workers .11 
X4 Workload degree  (managers tasks) which doesn't belong to functions .07 
X5 Degree of satisfaction with work -.06 
X7 Amount of control of process and results of the performed works on the part of the 
manager of office 
-.06 
Х21_1 Efficiency and rationality of actions of the hospital managers. .05 
X2 Do you know the indicators of productivity of your work? .05 
Х30 Age category .05 
 
Apparently according to the data of tab. 6, the opportunism of managers of offices (factor X22_2) has the 
maximum impact on the level of opportunism of the managers of hospital [R =.82, R2 =.68, p <.01]. It means that the 
opportunism of the managers of hospital for 68,3% depends on opportunism of managers of offices. Influence of 
opportunism of the personnel is very insignificant (X23 factor) [R =.33, R2 =.11, p<.01]. 
These conclusions correspond to the received results of the analysis of labor opportunism of the personnel (see 
model 2, tab. 3) where the greatest extent of influence on opportunism of the personnel is rendered by opportunism of 
the managers of hospital (R2 =.33). 
The conducted research on data of model 3 (tab. 5) allowed to construct the equation of regression of 
opportunism of the managers of a clinic and to calculate its quantitative level: 
Y =.05Х2 +.07Х4-.07Х5 –.06Х7 +.12Х8_1-.13Х8_2 +.17Х9_1-.15 X9_2 +.25Х11_1-.15Х11_2 +.06Х21_1 
+.68Х22_2 +.11Х23 +.05Х30 = .40            [2] 
Predicted level of opportunism of the managers of a clinic made .40 that significantly exceeds the level of 
opportunism of the personnel which made .28. 
4. Discussion 
The received results of the conducted research allow claiming that a source of labor opportunism in a clinic is 
interdependence of opportunism of the management of hospital and managers of offices. Nature of this interaction 
generates the corresponding wave effects by which the level of opportunism of all personnel of a clinic is defined. For 
check of reliability of this conclusion models 4 and 5 of pair regressions were constructed at which on the received 
coefficients of regression it is possible to estimate force of mutual influence of these factors. 
 
Table 6. Influence of opportunism of managers of offices on opportunism of heads of hospital 
Model 4: OLS, supervision used 1-618  
Dependent variable: X22_1-opportunism heads of hospital 
Variables B Std. Error t p 
Х22_2 .94 .01 70.11 .00 
R = .94 R2 =.89 F = 4916.55 p < .01 
 
A dependent variable was X22_1 - opportunism of heads of the hospital and independent - X22_2-opportunism 
managers of offices. 
This model 6 reflects close dependence: change of level of opportunism of managers of offices on 1 will lead 
to change of level opportunism of heads of hospital on.94. In model 5 these variables were swapped: 
 
Table 7. Influence of opportunism of heads of hospital on opportunism of managers of offices 
Model 5: OLS, supervision used 1-618  
Dependent variable: X22_2-opportunism managers of offices 
Variables B Std. Error t p 
Х22_1 .94 .01 70.1 .00 
R = .94 R2 =.89 F = 4916.55 p < .01 
     
Model 5 reflects dependence, equivalent on influence force: with a growth of level of opportunism of heads of 
hospital on 1 - level the opportunism of managers of offices will grow on.94.  
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The equilibrium constructive relations between key official categories are a condition of effective self-
development of a war veteran’s hospital. Balance in the labor relations form the comfortable moral and psychological 
labor atmosphere which doesn't constrain a creative initiative of the personnel, and itself is a powerful system motivator 
of labor activity. 
For verification of this assumption the assessment of level of stability of the opportunistic balance which 
developed between heads of hospital and managers of offices was carried out.  
In the formalized look the condition of stability of opportunistic balance can be presented in the form of the 
following dependence:                       ОpH 1 minОpM  o                                                                                   [3]                            
Where ОpH – level of opportunism of heads of a hospital  
OpM - level of opportunism of managers of offices. 
Both parties are interested in minimization of level of opportunism as both suffer from the fact of its existence 
therefore this dependence is directed to a minimum. However, the equality condition in levels of opportunism can be 
met and at rather high values.  
Level of opportunism of managers of offices was determined by results of the corresponding correlation and 
regression analysis. On the received coefficients of regression the regression equation is constructed [4]: 
Y =-.05Х2 +. 06X6_2 +. 06Х7-.12Х8_1 +.18Х8_2-.18Х9_1 +.14Х9_2 +.07Х10-.11Х11_1 +.17X11_2 
+.06Х20-.05Х21_1 +.08Х21_2 +.71X22_1 +.05X23 =.39                                                                                              [4] 
Having substituted average values of the corresponding variables in this equation, the average quantitative 
assessment of level of opportunism of managers of offices of a clinic was calculated: Y =.39 
Similar calculation of level of opportunism of heads of a clinic was carried out above on model 3 (tab. 5) and 
made .40 (the equation of regression [2]). 
Stability of opportunistic balance in a clinic is almost ideal as it is most approached to 1:  
ОpH .40 1.01ОpM .39  
 
This result is very close to the equilibrium.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Excess of level of opportunism of one of the parties causes aspiration of other party to restore the broken 
balance, having lifted own opportunism to an appropriate level. As it, as a rule, occurs in rather short-term period of 
time, the first party perceives strengthening of opportunism of the opponents as a direct call and starts increasing in 
reply in even bigger measure the level of opportunism. Then again opponents join this process that leads to emergence 
of a peculiar effect of competition which has destructive character. As a rule, it brings the organization into a condition 
of an opportunistic trap. 
Anything similar isn't present in a war veteran’s hospital where the long-term stable condition of opportunistic 
balance at rather low level was created. In this equilibrium situation there is no incentive to change or violation of the 
reached opportunistic balance unilaterally as the result of similar violation will be worse, than the developed 
equilibrium compliance. 
The level of opportunism of the personnel is influenced by opportunism of the managers of a clinic (regression 
model 2 (tab. 3)). Thus the numerical value of opportunism of the personnel calculated on the equation of regression of 
model 2 makes.28 that is much lower than opportunism of the managers of a clinic (.40). 
Stability of opportunistic balance of interaction of opportunism of the personnel and the managers makes 1.4 
.40 1.40
.28
ОpM
ОpP   
 
It means that the opportunism of the personnel isn't primary; its role is supporting, subordinated and is 
response to manager’s opportunism. Considering that the tendency of interaction of opportunism of the parties, 
according to a formula [3], strives for equilibrium compliance, the tendency to growth of level of opportunism of the 
personnel in the short term to reach managers opportunism level is quite probable. 
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